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The history of communication technologies is populated with conflicts between 
centralization and decentralization. While many of these technologies started or have 
existed at some point of their development as a decentralized structure, often replacing 
older technological paradigms, nearly all progressively evolved into concentrated clusters 
of power as a result of industrialization and of the reaffirmation of state sovereignty, 
following a Schumpeterian process of “creative-destruction” (Wu, 2010). However, when 
the needs of citizens turn out to be systematically overlooked in existing power dynamics, 
decentralized initiatives may emerge as an attempt to disrupt the dominant hegemony and 
allow for the democratic re-appropriation of technology – a process that the philosopher 
Andrew Feenberg calls “subversive rationalization” (Feenberg, 1995).  
In this paper, we focus on an ongoing – though too often neglected – phenomenon of 
decentralization in telecommunications networks. We show that current telecoms 
regulation significantly overlooks the contribution of community networks in fostering 
political and socio-economic objectives associated with broadband policy and we propose 
a number of policy recommendations to overcome this gap. 
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1. A short history of the Internet access market in Europe 
Since its early days, the Internet has followed a trend of emancipation. Already 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, engineers and early hackers were experimenting with 
computers and exploring the potential of these new machines as communications devices. 
But it is only in the following years, as personal computing boomed and the computer 
networks spread, that efforts from civil society to democratize the use of these 
revolutionary technologies went viral. The creation of the World Wide Web in 1989 
finally opened the door to widespread Internet use. 
In the mid-1990's, the Internet access market boomed in Europe, partly because 
incumbent network operators had to open up the infrastructure rolled-out by state 
monopolies to small and innovative ISPs. In a context of rapid privatization, regulation 
promoted facility-based competition4 and new companies began laying down their own 
network infrastructure. This, along with the explosion of mobile telephony and the 
democratization of Internet access, made liberalization look like a success story: 
innovation in telecom services was dynamic and fast-paced, prices were low, and the 
number of subscribers surged. 
Today, the EU regulatory framework is still often praised when compared to the 
situation in the US, where local Internet access markets are generally under a duopoly. 
Regulatory policies have indeed ensured some level of competition in European markets. 
But more in more, the two markets have a similar outlook: EU telecom policy has been 
unable to prevent the growing concentration of power in the telecommunications sector. 
Ex ante merger control by the EU Commission has typically been loose (Thatcher, 2014; 
Stoyanova, 2008), leading to de facto oligopolies in national or regional markets. 
Meanwhile, abuses of dominant positions by incumbent network operators are fairly 
common.  
Overall, in the EU, policy targets in terms of broadband penetration and quality of 
service remain a distant reality: more than a third of European households still have no 
broadband access (39%) and, in a country such as Greece, broadband penetration is as 
low a 56% (EU Commission, 2013). A fifth of EU citizens with no Internet access say 
they are deterred by the sheer cost of it (EU Commission, 2013): the cheapest available 
broadband offer can be as high as €46.20 in Cyprus, €38.70 in Spain or €31.40 in Ireland 
(EU Commission, 2014a). Meanwhile, users are not provided with the service they paid 
                                                
4  Facility-based competition, or infrastructure-based competition, refers to the 
regulatory focus on creating competition between telecom firms that each have their own 
distinct network infrastructure for delivering end-user services, such as Internet access 
provision. 
for: on average, they only get 75% of the broadband speed they signed up for; 63% when 
they get it through ADSL rather than cable or fiber lines (SamKnows, 2013). The 
situation is usually much worse in rural areas. Meanwhile, telecom operators also have 
the technical ability and economic or regulatory incentives to hinder the autonomy of 
Internet users, for instance by violating the principle of Net neutrality. 
The trend towards centralization, combined with economic incentives and regulations 
encouraging surveillance and control has led to the revival of more decentralized, citizen-
centric network architectures. This is illustrated, in recent years, by the deployment of 
Wireless Community Networks (WCN) —grassroots community networks, deployed at 
the local or regional level, managed by the community and for the community.  
All across Europe, and beyond, there are currently a large number of grassroots 
community networks seeking to provide a decentralized alternative and more commons-
based approach to the current Internet infrastructure. Rather than being driven by profits 
like most of the large, highly capitalized Internet Service Providers (ISPs), WCN focus 
on the actual needs of its participants. While most of them are very limited in scope – and 
are therefore not widely heard of –, the most popular ones enjoy more than dozens of 
thousands of users.5 
2. Community networks and new power dynamics in telecom 
infrastructures 
 
Given the considerable investments required to set up an independent network 
infrastructure, and given the costs of purchasing wholesale access to last-mile landline 
networks from commercial operators, many grassroots community networks have 
decided to operate via wireless technologies, setting up network of peers sharing radio 
signals. Most of their network infrastructure consists of wireless radio equipment: Wi-Fi 
routers and antennas strategically distributed at different locations so as to maximize 
coverage. As a result, they can often provide a service of better quality than that which is 
generally available from commercial alternatives. 
At the operational level, almost every grassroots community network tries to promote 
users' autonomy and fundamental rights to communication and privacy. As opposed to 
                                                
5  For the purpose of this paper, we focused on a handful of groups, and in particular FreiFunk 
(Germany), Wlan Slovenija (Slovenia), Guifi.net (Spain) and Tetaneutral.net in Toulouse (France) – the 
latter is also a member of the FFDN, a federation of French grassroots networks initially spearheaded by 
the landline community network FDN. Other European WCN include Ninux (Italy), Funfeuer (Austria), the 
Athens Wireless Metropolitan Network (Greece), Djurslands.net (Denmark) and Czfree.net (Czech 
Republic). 
commercial ISPs blocking certain ports and censoring websites or content, community 
networks ardently protects Net neutrality. In several countries, small community 
networks are usually not bound by censorship orders issued by courts against illegal 
online content. In this regard, user autonomy and self-reliance is maximal when WCN are 
apprehended not just as part of the wider Internet but as autonomous local networks (or 
Intranets), allowing users to share information with other users connected to the same 
community network. Local networks also enable users to escape from the ubiquitous and 
pervasive surveillance that is occurring on the global Internet, as a result of privacy-
intrusive practices undertaken by traditional online operators. In particular, given the lack 
of a central authority regulating access to the network, it is in theory more difficult for 
anyone to assess the real identity of users connected to these networks. 
Accordingly, WCN constitute, essentially, a political choice: by establishing a mix of 
social and relational ties between participants involved in the provision of the network 
infrastructure, they promote a more democratic and cooperative political system, with a 
more symmetrical and participatory governance structure (Bauwens, 2005). Besides, 
most of these grassroots community networks experiment with novel models of 
distributed governance relying on cooperation and sharing among a community of peers 
(from a dozen to tens of thousands participants), and that are reminiscent of commons-
based peer production schemes (Benkler, 2006). 
From a political standpoint, WCN can be regarded as a counter-power to currently 
established power structures or incumbents. Following the typology of social movements 
drawn by Stefania Milan in her analysis of “emancipatory communication practices”, we 
can infer three ways by which community networks could counteract existing power 
dynamics in the telecom sector. 
One way is to address the issue from within the political system, as insiders, formally 
interacting with the power holders in order to make them support the deployment of 
community networks. Another solution is to fight the problem as outsiders, pressuring 
both regulators and incumbents from outside the political system, by means of protests, 
demonstrations and other campaigning tactics aimed at voicing dissent against the 
practices of commercial ISPs and against the lack of appropriate regulation for 
community networks.  
Yet, most community networks do not properly qualify as what social movement 
scholars define as “insiders” (although they sometimes do interact with policy-makers), 
and much less as outsiders. Mostly, they fall within the third category – what Milan 
identifies as “beyonders”. They acknowledge that law and regulation will always be late 
compared to practice and private ordering, and purport to influence the networked 
ecosystem by remaining beyond the political system. This objective is achieved by 
building self-organized, decentralized and citizen-owned communications networks and 
setting up alternative socio-political and technical arrangements as a substitute for the 
traditional top-down power dynamics typical of traditional institutions.  
WCN can also be regarded as a potential source of competition to mainstream 
commercial ISPs. As we have seen, not only can WCN provide better services than 
commercial alternatives, they also adhere to specific ethical commitments and 
governance structures. As opposed to commercial providers, which often go counter to 
the interests of consumers by engaging in anti-competitive behaviors, WCN promote 
open and democratic values, such as Net neutrality and consumer protection. While they 
do not directly wage competition against traditional ISP, these nonprofit, community 
networks serve to increase diversity in the market for Internet access – thereby opening 
up the range of options available to citizens. In this sense, WCN constitute a form of 
grassroots, bottom-up regulation of established players that simply emerges from there 
being a viable (and more attractive) alternative to the dominant, commercial system. 6 
At this point in time, however, WCN cannot totally emancipate from traditional 
incumbents. Although they can be completely autonomous when they operate as closed 
local networks, most community networks eventually need to connect with the global 
Internet network. Uplink Internet access is achieved by linking the local network to one 
or several “Internet gateways” in charge of routing the traffic from and to global 
backbones.7 Here, potential bottlenecks resurface. 
To obtain such an uplink to the Internet, community networks currently choose from a 
number of strategies. The first is to use upstream through traditional mainstream last-mile 
ISPs. Some WCN, like Freifunk in Berlin, prefers not to build any formal relationship 
with third party ISPs, and simply rely on the goodwill of community members (who are 
also subscribers of commercial ISPs) to share their commercial Internet connection so as 
to provide bandwidth and connectivity to the rest of the network.  
When relying exclusively on the uplink connections of mainstream ISPs to provide a 
gateway to the Internet is not possible, or perhaps simply not reliable enough, WCN must 
establish a commercial relationship with transit ISPs. The transit market is generally 
much more competitive than the mainstream last-mile Internet access markets. Lesser 
                                                
6 In Berlin, for instance, Freifunk's popularity actually brought incumbent telecom operators to update their 
service agreements enabling subscribers to share their DSL connection to contribute bandwidth to the 
network. 
7 An Internet gateway is all that is required to connect a particular network to an 
existing Internet connection. The gateway router will share bandwidth with other devices 
on the network from that connection. Multiple gateways can be deployed on the same 
network to provide additional bandwidth, as does for instance Tetaneutral.net. 
concentration creates a more diverse ecosystem where multinational firms, such as 
Cogent or Level 3, compete with smaller, local companies. Diversity drives both 
competition and cooperation, and allows grassroots community networks to escape the 
risk of abusive behaviors on the part of incumbent operators. For instance, in New York, 
the RedHook initiative is getting support from both medium-sized ISPs (such as 
Brooklyn Fiber) and a number of even smaller ones established in the area.  
That being said, one cannot rule out the possibility of a transit operator exerting 
control over, and even disconnecting, a community network. To the extent that in some 
markets (in both urban and rural areas) a few large telecom operators retain the ability to 
filter, censor, monitor, discriminate online communications, or simply refuse to 
interconnect, the need for uplink leads to the emergence of new bottlenecks that replicate 
the problems that community networks aimed to address in the first place. 
To meet that challenge, some activists have begun to organize: the goal is for 
community networks to collectively acquire more independence and more bargaining 
power in the various markets in which they operate, and promote their philosophy in the 
face of the conflicting value systems of commercial telecom operators who might engage 
in predatory practices. A first experiment of this kind was carried on in 2012, when 
community networks FunkFeuer from Austria, NEDWirelles from Croatia, and Wlan 
Slovenija established a wireless backbone spanning across geographical borders to create 
a direct link between them. As the number of mesh networks deployed over the world 
grow, the potential for establishing a global and independent network infrastructure that 
abides to the founding principles of the Internet network will also increase.  
3. Regulatory framework favoring commercial players at the expense of 
WCN 
Despite their potential in fostering public interest goals in telecom policy, regulators 
have so far failed to support the efforts of community networks. More often than not, 
public policy actually puts important hurdles on their way. 
The most striking example of such hurdles relates is that several community networks 
have been precluded from using public broadband networks funded with taxpayers’ 
money. In France for instance, many local governments invested in rolling-out fiber 
networks in both urban and rural areas. These networks are built and managed by a 
private company contracted by the public authority, which leases access to traditional 
access providers that sell Internet access offers to subscribers. Yet, the fee charged to 
access the network is designed for big commercial ISPs, and is often prohibitive for 
nonprofit grassroots community networks. 
Another other major problem of current telecom policies for WCN is the issue of 
spectrum management. Again, regulatory capture by commercial interests leads to 
regulatory choices that systematically overlook the potential of more flexible and citizen-
centric policies. The recent allocations so-called “digital dividend” (i.e. the frequencies 
left vacant by the switch from analog to digital television) is a textbook case. In France, 
for instance, it was proposed to use part of the spectrum dividend to create new digital 
TV channels and develop mobile television as well as digital radio (neither of these two 
technologies has taken off thus far). The remaining half of these frequencies for the lower 
UHF bands (sought-after because of their long-range propagation) was then auctioned off 
to telecom operators for their 4G mobile Internet access.  
In the process, one option has, however, never been considered: extending 
“unlicensed” access to some of these frequencies, effectively turning them into a 
commons open for all to use. Long thought to be unreasonable because of the risk of 
radio interferences, opening up the spectrum to multiple, non-coordinated radio users has 
actually been experimented on a worldwide basis more than a decade ago for the Wi-Fi 
frequencies. Needless to say, it has proved to be a very wise policy choice.  
Against the backdrop of traditional economic theory, open spectrum policies suggest 
that commons-based approach to many-to-many communication infrastructure can 
actually work in practice. Through packet switching, best-effort delivery, as well as 
innovative radio transmission and bandwidth management’s techniques, Wi-Fi has 
successfully verified Ostrom's claim that users themselves and ad hoc technical standards 
can create and enforce rules that mitigate the over-exploitation of the commons (Ostrom, 
1990). In many regards, though property-based allocations of spectrum and exclusive 
licensing still have the upper hand, they have often come short of fostering public interest 
goals, for instance by causing a very significant underutilization of this public resource.8 
                                                
8 First, exclusive licensing have led to anti-competitive behaviors by spectrum 
owners, or favored certain technologies over potentially more promising ones. For 
example, several countries grant exclusive licenses to established commercial players 
providing Internet access through WiMAX or satellite, and even subsidize them. Second, 
such schemes have proved to encourage underutilization of the resource in the name of 
avoiding congestion, thus creating artificial scarcity of frequency bands. Many spectrum 
owners, be they the military or commercial operators (again, satellite or WiMAX come to 
mind) own important portions of spectrum but do not actually make full use of it, thus 
crowding out other technologies and potential uses of social value. TV and radio 
broadcasters also leave significant gaps between their respective channels (these so-called 
“white spaces”) acting as buffers to avoid interference – thereby leaving many 
frequencies unused in the valuable UHF bands. Combined together, these phenomena 
bring underutilization to stunning levels: a recent study conducted for the EU 
Commission finds that, in Paris, the average spectrum use is as low as 7,7% of the 
400MHz-3GHz bands, while the average spectrum utilization rate in Europe is under 
Moreover, not only does the regulatory focus on exclusive licensing create an enormous 
opportunity cost by favoring established players over innovative new-entrants (such as 
community networks), it has even been argued by human rights NGOs that it may 
actually breach the international law on freedom of expression (Article 19, 2005). 
 Meanwhile, despite the successes of Wi-Fi, unlicensed access to spectrum remains 
marginal and regulators have a tendency to ignore WCN’s spectrum needs. Guifi.net and 
Freifunk, for instance, report having a hard time maintaining the quality of their network 
because of the saturation of the 5GHz frequency bands.9 Another issue for WCN is linked 
to the topography of their environment: Wi-Fi bands have some important technical 
limitations, in particular in terms of propagation, and signals are easily blocked by 
buildings or trees. WCN are thus faced with the choice of either renouncing to create a 
new radio link in a given location, or push the emission power levels beyond the legal 
limits to overcome these obstacles.  
3. Towards a new public policy for the network commons 
Much can be done at the regulatory level not only to lift the technical, legal and policy 
hurdles that community networks run into, but also to actively support them. Several 
elements presented in the course of this paper – from regulatory capture to the impressive 
results achieved by these small nonprofit citizen groups – show that this is both an urgent 
and sound policy move.  
First, there is a range of regulations that make WCN's very existence significantly and 
often unnecessarily difficult. In a country such as Belgium for instance, the registration 
fee that telecom operators must pay to the NRA is relatively high, whereas in France, 
Spain or Germany, it is free – which may explain why the movement is much more 
dynamic in these countries. It is, therefore, all the more important that registration 
processes be harmonized at the EU level, and, in particular, that they remain free for 
nonprofit networks. 
Second, several laws seek to prevent the sharing of Internet connections amongst 
several users by making people responsible (and potentially liable) for all 
communications made through their Wi-Fi connection. This is the case in France, for 
                                                                                                                                            
10% (Forge & al., 2012).  
9 WCN theoretically could be allowed to use the other portion of spectrum by 
NRAs. Yet, they also refrain from doing so. Except for the 2,4GHz and 5GHz license-
exempt bands were high demand has driven prices down, radio networking remains a 
niche market for manufacturers of radio transmitters, and the gear necessary to deploy 
wireless networks in other bands is costly. Community networks generally cannot afford 
the price. 
instance, where the 2009 three-strikes copyright law against peer-to-peer file-sharing also 
introduced a tort for improperly securing one's Internet connection against unlawful 
activity on the part of a third party. As a result, many community networks willing to 
establish open Wi-Fi networks in public spaces, such as parks and streets, refrain from 
doing so out of legal insecurity. It is our view that, even though connection sharing might 
sometimes make law enforcement more difficult by allowing many unrelated users to 
share the same IP address, this drawback is more than compensated by the benefits 
brought about by the deployment of open wireless networks.  
Third, it is not just Internet wireless access points that can be shared, but also the 
intangible infrastructure on which radio signals travel. As we have seen, unlicensed 
spectrum is a key asset for community networks to set up affordable and flexible last-
mile infrastructure, but it is currently very limited. In the US, the FCC has initiated 
promising policies in that field.10 But for the moment, the EU has shied away from 
similar moves. In 2012, the EU adopted its first Radio Spectrum Policy Programme 
(RSPP). During the legislative process, the EU Parliament voted in favor of ambitious 
amendments aimed at opening more spectrum to unlicensed uses.11 Even if some of these 
amendments were later scrapped by national governments, the final text still calls for 
member states and the European Commission to “assess” the “need for and feasibility of 
extending the allocations of unlicensed spectrum” in the Wi-Fi bands, while also voicing 
tepid support for mesh networks by stressing their potential to foster access to the global 
Internet. As EU lawmakers were working on the RSPP, a study commissioned by the EU 
Commission also called for a new 100 MHz of license-exempt bands as well as for higher 
power output limits in rural areas to reduce the cost of broadband Internet access 
deployment.12 Since then, however, EU work on unlicensed spectrum and on flexible 
                                                
10 For the past years, through several regulatory moves, the FCC has been opening 
UHF “white spaces” to unlicensed uses. It has also started expanding the so-called 
“Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure” by adding 195MHz of spectrum in the 
5GHz band and increase the permissible power for radio transmitters in these bands. See 
Farivar, C. (2014, March 31). More Wi-Fi is better: FCC expands use of 5GHz spectrum. 
Ars Technica. Retrieved May 11, 2014, from http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2014/03/more-wi-fi-is-better-fcc-expands-use-of-5-GHz-spectrum/ 
11 La Quadrature du Net. (2011, May 11). EU Parliament Adopts Open Wireless 
Communications Policy. LaQuadrature.net. Retrieved May 12, 2014, from 
http://www.laquadrature.net/en/eu-parliament-adopts-open-wireless-communications-
policy 
12 For giving unlicensed access to another 100MHz of spectrum bands, the report 
suggested that half of these should be in the 1 GHz bands and the other one at 1,4 GHz. 
To avoid underutilization, the report also calls on policy-makers to suspend exclusive use 
authorization schemes that would be more accessible to community networks has stalled. 
In a communication released in September 2012, the EU Commission failed to announce 
any concrete action to expand unlicensed use of the spectrum (European Commission, 
2012). At the national level too, there is unfortunately no policy change in sight. 
Fourth, networks built with taxpayers’ money could also be treated as a commons, and 
as such should remain free from corporate capture. Regulators should ensure that 
nonprofit community networks can access publicly-funded and subsidized physical 
infrastructures without unnecessary financial or administrative hurdles. Accordingly, they 
should review existing policies and current practices in this field, providing transparent 
information to map publicly funded networks, and mandate rules to allow community 
networks to use these on a preferential basis.13  
Of course, countless other policy initiatives can help support grassroots networks, such 
as small grants and subsidies to help these groups buy servers and radio equipment, 
communicate around their initiative, but also support their research on radio transmission, 
routing methods, software or encryption (Shaffer, 2013).  
Yet, all these proposed policies point to an overarching issue, namely the need to 
democratize telecom policy and establish procedures that can institutionalize existing and 
potential grassroots community networks. In many countries, such as Spain or Italy, even 
though city councils may occasionally actively support these organizations to the extent 
that they provide better Internet access to their citizens, regional governments and 
national regulators have so far largely neglected them.  
Given the revival of community networks in the past years, it is not enough for 
regulatory authorities to treat citizens as mere consumers by occasionally inviting 
consumer organizations at the table. Regulators and policy-makers need to recognize that 
the Internet architecture is a contested site, and that citizen groups across Europe and 
beyond are showing that for the provision of Internet access, commons-based forms of 
                                                                                                                                            
of specific channels whenever the use of that spectrum is consistently below a level 
justifying any form of exclusivity (Forge & al., 2012). In France, where WiMAX roll-out 
has been so slow that the NRA eventually notified the corresponding licensees that they 
were in breach of their obligations, such a measure could lead to many more channels 
being opened up for shared or even unlicensed use, for instance to community networks.  
13 On very-fast broadband roll-out, our interviewees also pointed to the need to 
reorient both public and private investments in fiber-optic last-mile networks where they 
are most needed, that is in rural communities where decent broadband is crucially 
lacking, rather than in already well-connected urban areas where there is usually less 
demand for higher speeds. They also called on regulators to better coordinate so that any 
public work being carried to roll-out fiber-optic cables that can then be used to expand 
and improve Internet access.  
governance are not only possible but that they also represent effective and viable 
alternatives to the most powerful telecom operators. Their participants have both the 
expertise and legitimacy to take an integral part in technical and legal debates over 
broadband policy in which traditional, commercial ISPs are over-represented. They can 
bring informed and dissenting views to these debates, and eventually help alleviate 
regulatory capture.  
 
But democratizing telecom policy is not the sole responsibility of institutional actors. 
If regulators are not ready to listen, community networks must organize politically and 
pressure them to do so. Indeed, many community networks are working to form a more 
cohesive and powerful group to discuss legislative issues and advocate regulatory 
reforms. Of course, a potential problem for sustaining political engagement is the fact 
that community networks are often run by volunteers whose lack of time and resources 
may sometimes make it difficult form them to participate as actively as the full-time and 
well-resourced lobbyists of incumbent actors. But overtime, as the movement grows, it 
may be able sustain its engagement with public authorities, especially if the latter adapts 
and establish ad hoc contact channels and remote participation mechanisms. Going back 
to the typology of political action, direct engagement with policy-makers constitutes a 
more “insider” strategy that might well be worth pursuing. 
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